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NOTES 
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants 
Under Rule 11 
Jeremy D. Spector 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the myriad rules and statutes designed to curb litigation 
abuse, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") is 
"the most widely used and most controversial of the sanctions 
rules."1 The increased use of Rule ll2 during the last fifteen years3 
1. Melissa L. Nelken, Introduction to SECTION OF LmG., AMERICAN BAR AssN., SANC­
TIONS: RuLE 11 AND OnmR POWERS 1 {Melissa L. Nelken ed .. 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter 
SANCTIONs]; see also GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LmGATION 
ABusE § 1, at 2 {1989) {finding Rule 11 to be "the most prominent provision authorizing 
sanctions for litigation abuse"). For other views on the "controversy" over Rule 11, see 
THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 169-70 (1988) {finding that over 
75% of judges and 67% of attorneys support the rule); William W Schwarzer, Rule I1 Revis­
ited, 101 HARV. L. R:Bv. 1013, 1014 n.3 {1988) (reporting that 93% of judges and 77% of 
attorneys agreed that Rule 11 sanctions are necessary to deter frivolous arguments (citing 
NEw YoRK STATE BAR AssN., REPoRT OF THE CoMMrITEE ON FEDERAL COURTS: 
SANCTIONS AND ArroRNEYs' FEES 3 (June 8, 1987))). 
2. Rule 11 requires a party to certify that the legal and factual contentions in any plead­
ings or other papers she submits to the court are not frivolous and that she is not offering the 
papers for any improper purpose. See FED. R. Crv. P. ll(b). The rule also sets forth a list of 
potential sanctions against any party who violates it; included in the list is an award of rea­
sonable attorney's fees to the offended party. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll{c). Rule 11 provides in 
pertinent part: 
(c) SANCTIONS. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court deter­
mines that subdivision {b) [proscribing improper or frivolous papers] has been violated, 
the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction 
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision {b) or are respon­
sible for the violation. 
{1) How Initiated. 
(A) By Motion. • . •  If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the 
motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred m presenting or oppos­
ing the motion. 
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable con­
duct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an 
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorney's fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
3. From the inception of the FRCP in 1938 until 1983, there were only a few dozen pub­
lished cases discussing the rule. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe 
Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal 
Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. R:Bv. 257, 257 (1991). Between August 1, 1983, when Rule 11 was 
amended to make the imposition of sanctions mandatory upon a finding of a violation, and 
August 1, 1985 alone, there were more than 200 reported decisions. See Melissa L. Nelken, 
2308 
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and the recent proliferation of fee-shifting provisions in federal 
statutes4 have led to an onslaught of motions for attorney's fees in 
the federal district courts.5 Simultaneously, these courts are seeing 
an increasing number of pro se litigants appear before them.6 The 
confluence of these two trends has produced the seemingly para­
doxical result of pro se parties seeking attorney's fees awards.7 
Over the past twenty years, pro se litigants have attempted to 
avail themselves of the attorney's fees provisions contained in such 
statutes as the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"),s the 
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),9 and the Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awards Act("§ 1988").10 Th�y have met with lim­
ited success.11 Very few pro se parties, however, have sought simi-
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle 
Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313, 1326 (1986). Rule 11 was 
amended in 1993 to make sanctions permissive again - and not mandatory - and to pro­
vide for a 21-day safe-harbor period during which litigants could retract the violative paper 
without incurring any sanction. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c). Although there is no available 
data on this point, one may assume that since the 1993 amendment, the number of Rule 11 
motions filed and Rule 11 sanctions granted has decreased significantly. 
4. A fee-shifting provision allows a litigant to recover attorney's fees from the opposing 
party; usually these provisions are enacted to encourage meritorious actions by plaintiffs who 
otherwise would not have adequate means to bring a lawsuit. See infra section III.A (discuss­
ing the goals of several fee-shifting statutes). Such provisions, of course, constitute excep­
tions to the default American Rule, under which each party to a lawsuit pays its own costs 
and fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). As of 
1993, there were 153 federal statutes that provided for a fees award. See ALBA CoNTE, 
ArroRNEY FEE AWARDS § 28.01 (2d ed. 1993). 
5. One court has opined, "[t]o the old adage that death and taxes share a certain inevita­
ble character, federal judges may be excused for adding attorneys' fees cases." Kennedy v. 
Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
6. A pro se litigant is one who appears on "one's own behalf . . .  as in the case of one who 
does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court." BLACK'S LAw D1cnoNARY 1221 
(6th ed. 1990). 
In 1993, pro se parties appeared in approximately 16,800 appeals in the federal courts. 
See STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF nm U.S. CoUR'IS, PR.o SE APPEALS: 
PR.o SE CASE PROCESSING IN nm U.S. CoUR'IS OF APPEALS 3 (July 1995). The 
Administrative Office does not keep track of the number of pro se parties at the district court 
level. Approximately 27% of the pro se appeals were civil filings, and approximately 66% 
were prisoner cases. See id. at 4. By 1996, the number of pro se appeals - cases in which 
either the appellant, the appellee, or both, proceeded without an attorney - had risen to 
22,258. See Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Pro Se Table B-9A, 
at 1 (Sept. 30, 1996) (reporting data for the twelve months ending September 30, 1996) 
(unpublished data on file with author). 
7. The paradox, of course, manifests itself in the assumption that a pro se litigant, who 
has not hired an attorney, could possibly recover attorney's fees. 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994 & Supp. I 1997). 
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1994). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (providing fees for cases involving, inter alia, § 1983). 
11. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991) (denying fees under§ 1988); Benavides v. 
Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying fees under the FOIA); Crooker v. 
EPA, 763F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiatn) (denying fees under the EAJA); Cazalas v. U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying fees under the FOIA). Most courts 
that deny fees requests under these statutes rely on both statutory language and legislative 
intent. See infra Part III. 
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lar awards under FRCP 11.12 For this reason, the question of 
whether a court can award fees to a pro se party under Rule 11 has 
had little opportunity to percolate in judicial opinions and academic 
literature. 
In the three cases in which courts have examined this issue, the 
decisions are split as to whether or not to award the fees.13 As with 
the statutory fee-shifting provisions, the debate in the Rule 11 con­
text pits arguments based on policy against arguments based on lan­
guage. Those who support the award contend that granting 
attorney's fees furthers Congress's intent of deterring conduct that 
violates Rule 11; those who disfavor the award assert that the words 
attorney's fees necessarily contemplate the existence of an attorney­
client relationship. Therefore, they conclude, by definition a pro se 
litigant is not entitled to the fees award. 
This Note argues that courts should grant a pro se litigant rea­
sonable attorney's fees when the opposing party has violated Rule 
11.14 Part I examines the goals of Rule 11 and concludes that Con­
gress intended deterrence of abusive practices to drive the Rule 11 
inquiry. Other, less important goals that inform the analysis include 
compensation of the offended party and punishment of the offend­
ing party. Part II discusses the factors that influence a judge in 
choosing a particular sanction and demonstrates that both practical 
and policy-oriented criteria support an award of attorney's fees 
12. See infra note 13. 
13. Only one published and two unpublished decisions discuss an award of attorney's fees 
to a pro se litigant under Rule 11. See Committe v. Dennis Reimer Co., 150 F.R.D. 495 (D. 
Vt 1993) (denying fees, though conceding that an award would further the underlying policy 
of the rule), discussed infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; Salamon v. Messina, No. frl­
C-2097, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6118 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1991) (denying fees on grounds that 
movant acted pro se), affd., Nos. 91-2248, 91-2400, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5884 (7th Cir. Mar. 
25, 1997), discussed infra note 62; Rynkiewicz v. Jeanes Hosp., Civ. A. No. 86-5209, 1987 WL 
7842 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 19fr/) (awarding fees in light of Rule ll's goals), discussed infra notes 
42-44 and accompanying text); cf. Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) (award­
ing attorney's fees to a pro se litigant under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38), dis­
cussed infra note 52. The Committe court observed: "Although the Court is certain that this 
question has been presented to the federal courts previously, it has been unable to find a 
discussion of this precise issue in the reported case law." Committe, 150 F.R.D. at 501. 
It is unclear why pro se litigants have not sought fees under Rule 11 more often. It may 
be that, because these parties often are not trained attorneys, they do not catch those 
instances in which the opposition files a frivolous or harassing paper. Nonetheless, given the 
flurry of pro se activity under the fee-shifting statutes, one might expect to see Rule 11 fees 
petitions being filed more frequently. Anecdotal evidence and the paucity of reported cases, 
however, suggest that pro se parties are not making these motions. See Telephone Interview 
with Judy Christie, Administrative Manager, United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan (June 18, 1997) (stating that she could not recall ever having seen such a 
motion). 
14. This Note assumes throughout that the trial judge has already determined that one 
party has violated Rule 11 and that sanctions are warranted. The Note therefore is limited to 
that part of the Rule 11 inquiry in which the judge chooses exactly what sanction to impose. 
For an excellent discussion of the criteria informing the violation analysis, see SANcnoNs, 
supra note 1. See also JOSEPH, supra note 1, § 3, at 29-30. 
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even when the movant acts pro se. Part m contrasts the policy of 
Rule 11 with the goals of the fee-shifting provisions in three federal 
statutes.15 Part ID concludes that, although courts almost uni­
formly deny pro se litigants fees under those statutes, the policies 
behind the fee-shifting provisions do not implicate the concerns 
addressed by Rule 11; therefore, courts are not bound by the cases 
denying fees under those statutes. Finally, Part IV suggests a means 
of calculating the ultimate award to the pro se litigant. 
I. THE GoAL(s) OF RuLE 11 
Deterrence must underlie any Rule 11 decision because "the 
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter" abusive practices and friv­
olous arguments.16 The 1983 amendments to the rule reinforced 
this notion by adding the word "sanctions" to the rule's title.17 In 
making this change, the committee intended to "stress[ ] a deterrent 
orientation" for courts addressing violations of Rule 11.18 Finally, 
the Supreme Court has recently declared that "the central purpose 
of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings."19 
The Supreme Court may recognize punishment as an additional 
rationale for imposing a Rule 11 sanction,20 even though its recent 
cases have emphasized deterrence. Moreover, the advisory com­
mittee has previously noted that "punishment of a violation . . . is 
part of the court's responsibility for securing the system's effective 
operation."21 Though several lower courts and commentators have 
echoed this position,22 they have not always seen punishment as a 
15. Tue three statutes that have formed the bulk of the case law discussing awards of 
attorney's fees to pro se litigants are the EAJA, the FOIA, and § 1988. See supra notes 8-10 
and accompanying text. 
16. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 13; see also Fred A. Smith 
Lumber Co. v. Edidin, 845 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1988). Rule 11 provides: "A sanction 
imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of 
such conduct . . • .  " FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2). Tue long-term goals of the rule include increas­
ing the professionalism of the bar and ensuring that parties bring only legitimate disputes to 
the court. See Wn.LGING, supra note 1, at 172. 
17. Tue rule's full title is "Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; 
Representations to Court; Sanctions." FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 12 (1983 amendment). 
19. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 552 
(1991) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (internal quota­
tion marks omitted)); cf. In re Yagman (Brown v. Baden), 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(noting that Rule ll's "primary purpose . . •  is to deter subsequent abuses"). 
20. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) 
(finding that Rule ll's "purpose is not reimbursement but 'sanction'"). 
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 14 (1983 amendment). Although 
the 1993 committee note does not contain similar language, it does not renounce the punish­
ment rationale found in this earlier comment. 
22. See, e.g., In re Kunstler (Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt), 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (noting that punishment and compensation are valid goals, but that courts should 
focus on deterrence); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 
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goal in and of itself as much as a means of achieving the deterrence 
objective.23 Given that view, and considering the Court's and advi­
sory committee's hesitancy to rely solely on a punishment-based 
theory, courts should consider punishment only as a secondary fac­
tor in the Rule 11 sanction analysis. 
Though also subordinate to the deterrence goal, a third, com­
pensatory objective inheres in the rule as well.24 Providing for a 
sanction such as attorney's fees - whose amount correlates to the 
expenses incurred by the offended party - appears to suggest a 
policy more akin to compensation than deterrence.2s The commit­
tee note makes clear, however, that a Rule 11 sanction, though 
potentially calculated on the basis of the movant's monetary 
expenditures, still has deterrence as its primary objective.26 Thus "a 
district court may take into account compensation of other parties 
1990) (same); Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11 
sanctions • . .  are . • .  punitive and deterrent in purpose {though they are also compensatory in 
effect)."), modified sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 {1990); 
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (commenting that Rule ll's 
two goals are punishment and deterrence (citing William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the 
New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201 {1985))); Schwarzer, supra, at 
185 (contending that the rule "is aimed at deterring and, if necessary, punishing improper 
conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing party"); id. at 201 {"The rule reflects 
a dual purpose: compensating the offended party for the expenses caused by a violation as 
well as penalizing the offender to achieve . • •  deterrence."). 
23. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 {11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 12 {1983 amendment)); Oliveri v. Thomp­
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 {2d Cir. 1986). 
24. See Salamon v. Messina, No. 87-C-2097, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6118, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
May 1, 1991) ("Rule 11 sanctions are designed to serve three purposes: (1) to compensate • • •  
(2) to punish • . .  and (3) to deter • . . •  "), affd., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5884 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 
1997); JOSEPH, supra note 1, § 16(C){l) {claiming that courts "uniformly accept the multiple 
- deterrent, compensatory and punitive - purposes of the Rule," although deterrence cer­
tainly remains the principal goal); see also cases cited supra note 22. 
Support for the compensatory rationale has endured notwithstanding the advisory com­
mittee's assertion that "the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compen­
sate." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 13; cf. Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. 
at 126 (stating that "[t]he purpose of the provision in question . . .  is not reimbursement but 
'sanction.' "). The committee note itself, however, provides a basis for the broader interpre­
tation of the rule's purposes: in listing the factors to be considered in choosing the sanction, 
the committee includes one criterion that is compensatory in nature - the effect of the 
violation on the expense of the litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note 
para. 12. 
One court has ventured that the rule "effectively picks up the torts of abuse of process . • •  
and malicious prosecution." Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 
(7th Cir. 1987). Under this rubric, the compensatory element would receive more attention. 
No other court, however, has relied on this language from Szabo; furthermore, the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the malicious-prosecution analogy in Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 
553 (citing Cooter & Gell). 
25. See William A. McCormack et al., First Circuit, in SANCTIONS, supra note 1, at 19, 26. 
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note paras. 12-13. 
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and punishment of the offender, but deterrence remains the touch­
stone of the Rule 11 inquiry."27 
When the movant acts pro se, emphasizing deterrence over 
compensation makes all the difference: because an unrepresented 
party's expenses will be relatively low, little if any deterrent effect 
would accrue from forcing the nonmovant to reimburse only those 
expenses. Were a court to focus on compensation, it would trans­
form Rule 11 into a fee-shifting statute, thereby undermining the 
Supreme Court's insistence that the rule remain a mechanism for 
preventing litigation abuse.28 With deterrence as the overriding 
theme, the actual amount of fees incurred becomes less important 
than the size of sanction required to send an effective message both 
to the offender and to the bar in general.29 
II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
A grant of attorney's fees to a pro se litigant follows directly 
from the legislative objective of deterrence. This Part illustrates the 
reasons for, and addresses the potential objections to, making an 
attorney's fees award to an unrepresented party. Section II.A 
explains that while trial judges have significant discretion in deter­
mining the type and severity of sanctions that they can impose 
under Rule 11, attorney's fees are by far the most frequent and 
most logical choice. Section II.A concludes that courts should 
make that same choice when the movant acts pro se. Section II.B 
refutes arguments against making the award - including those 
based on statutory language and on fears of granting movants 
potential windfalls - in favor of honoring the deterrence rationale 
that controls Rule 11. 
27. Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citing 
1983 advisory committee's note). 
28. See Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 533; cf. In re Kunstler {Robeson Defense Comm. v. 
Britt), 914 F.2d 505, 522 {4th Cir. 1990). In a study of seventeen federal trial judges, only 
three viewed compensation as the rule's primary goal. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 23. 
29. This is not to say that a compensatory element does not enter the equation at all. 
Indeed, Part IV argues that the best method for calculating an appropriate award is based on 
the compensation an attorney would receive for responding to the violative motion. The 
point here is that compensation of the pro se movant should not be the impetus behind the 
decision of what type of award to issue in the first place. Instead, the district court enjoys 
wide latitude to mete out a sanction that serves the rule's dete"ent objective. See infra notes 
45-50 and accompanying text. Once a judge decides, for deterrence-related reasons, to 
impose a significant monetary sanction, he can calculate that figure using compensatory con­
siderations. The choice of sanction is examined infra Part II. 
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A. Why Choose Attorney's Fees? 
Among all the sanctions a trial judge could choose, only attor­
ney's fees will fulfill the goals of Rule 11.30 Only if a court imposes 
a substantial monetary sanction - only if it "hits them where it 
hurts" - will parties be dissuaded from violating the rule's pre­
scriptions. A sanction imposing the mere costs incurred by a pro se 
litigant - for example, filing and copying costs - would be insig­
nifi.cant and thus would not deter future abusive conduct.31 A fees 
award, on the other hand, carries a large enough price tag that it 
will serve the appropriate deterrent effect. 
As an alternative, one might suggest assessing a fine payable 
directly to the court.32 This approach would provide the same 
deterrent effect as a fees award and simultaneously would avoid 
awarding fees when none were incurred. Such a route, however, 
would be unfavorable for several reasons. First, judges should 
strive to treat represented and unrepresented parties consistently 
30. One might argue that the very stigma associated with incurring a Rule 11 sanction 
could, by itself, dissuade some potential violators of the rule. If the case reports and attend· 
ant scholarship are any indication, however, neither judges nor academics consider that 
stigma sufficient to meet the rule's objectives. See infra note 51 and accompanying text; see 
also infra note 40 {discussing Rule 11 sanctions other than attorney's fees). 
31. The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 added attorney's fees to the list of possible sane· 
tions. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 3 {1983 amendment). This 
conspicuous change exemplified Congress's intent to put some bite in the rule and to discour· 
age violations of it more forcefully. Awarding unrepresented parties an amount equivalent to 
an attorney's fee furthers this goal. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 {11th Cir. 
1987) (en bane) {holding that the "imposition of a monetary sanction is a particularly reason· 
able use of a court's discretion under Rule 11"). 
32. Some have argued that ordering a monetary sanction in any amount greater than the 
attorney's fees actually incurred would constitute an imposition of a criminal fine for con· 
tempt; such a sanction would require the procedural safeguards afforded by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 42(b ), including a higher burden of proof and, in many cases, the right to 
a jury trial. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 {10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Nelken, 
supra note 3, at 1338 & n.163. But see Eisenberg v. University of N.M., 936 F.2d 1131, 1137 
{10th Cir. 1991). In Eisenberg, the Tenth Circuit distinguished - and severely limited - its 
earlier decision in Cotner and held that a fine is a proper Rule 11 sanction when it is neither 
arbitrary nor levied simply "to emphasize a point." See Cotner, 936 F.2d at 1136 (quoting 
Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. Masco Corp., 871 F.2d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 1989)); cf. In re Yagman 
(Brown v. Baden), 796 F.2d 1165, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a $250,000 award 
imposed without the Rule 42 safeguards, but noting that a Rule 11 sanction could constitute a 
criminal fine if the amount was "grossly disproportionate to the attorney's misconduct or 
otherwise [fell] outside the bounds of the authority for the sanction"). 
Perhaps the most persuasive reason to refrain from equating a Rule 11 monetary sanction 
with a fine for criminal contempt is that "[n]othing in the text of Rule 11 or in the Advisory 
Committee Note indicates that due process requires a court to follow the procedures called 
for by [Rule 42] . . . .  Both the note and policy considerations [such as limiting the sanction 
hearing to facts in the record] tend to the opposite conclusion." Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1558. 
Rule 11 requires only that, in imposing any sanction, including a fine, the court afford the 
nonmovant notice and the opportunity to be heard. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c). 
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that courts employ the phrase "monetary sanction" 
instead of "fine" to avoid the connotations and procedural requirements that attach to that 
latter term. See In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1180; Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 
F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed in Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1136-37. 
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- that is, they should impose similar sanctions for similarly offen­
sive conduct, regardless of who the offended party might be. 
Because represented parties whose opponents violate Rule 11 are 
almost always granted attorney's fees,33 pro se litigants should 
receive that same award.34 Second, requiring the nonmovant to pay 
the fine into court would deprive the pro se litigant of any compen­
sation, which is a lesser yet significant goal of the rule.35 This liti­
gant, after all, did experience some compensable harm - whether 
in terms of opportunity costs or in terms of the administrative costs 
of responding to the offensive paper.36 Third, the advisory commit­
tee itself suggests that there exist some circumstances in which the 
objectives of Rule 11 can be achieved only if the sanction is paid 
directly to the other party and not into court.37 Fourth, and perhaps 
most important, denying the unrepresented litigant any award, or 
compensating him solely for his costs, would reduce the incentive 
pro se parties have to bring Rule 11 actions - and thus would 
reduce enforcement of the rule itself. Once a litigant is aware that 
her pro se adversary is unlikely to institute a Rule 11 proceeding, 
that litigant may become more lax in monitoring and curbing her 
own potentially violative behavior.38 
When a party does violate Rule 11, the sanction should be only 
as severe as necessary to deter the offending party and the bar. 39 A 
33. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
34. Given that a pro se litigant himself can be sanctioned under Rule 11, see FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 2 (adopting the principle that the rule applies to "attor­
neys and pro se litigants"), equity demands that a pro se party's adversary abide by - and 
suffer the same consequences of - the rule as well. 
35. For a discussion of the compensatory goal, see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying 
text. 
36. For a discussion of opportunity costs, see infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
37. The committee note states that 
if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty. 
However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(l) violations, deterrence 
may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule to 
make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to 
those injured by the violation. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 13. Unfortunately, the committee does 
not explain the rationale behind this position. It is possible that the committee finds a certain 
moral appeal in having the offending party pay the offended party directly. 
38. As a compromise, one might suggest assessing a sanction payable partly to the 
movant and partly to the court. Cf. supra note 37 (quoting advisory committee note recog­
nizing that some situations will require splitting the award between the court and the movant, 
instead of paying it all into court). Doing so would obviate many of the concerns of awarding 
fees when none were incurred. See infra section II.B.2. F urthermore, a court could still grant 
the pro se litigant an amount sufficient to compensate him for any expenses incurred and to 
retain the incentive to bring the action. On the other hand, adopting this "split payment" 
approach would frustrate the consistency and ''moral appeal" goals discussed above. See 
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text; supra note 37. 
39. Rule 11 admonishes that any sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter 
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct." FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2). For cases 
invoking this premise, see Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990); 
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fees award therefore might not be necessary if a court could meet 
the deterrence goal through other, nonmonetary sanctions. 4o The 
reverse, however, is also true. A court may impose a sanction in 
excess of the movant's attorney's fees if the court believes that such 
a sanction is necessary to deter further violative conduct. 41 
Consider the case of Rynkiewicz v. Jeanes Hospital. 42 There the 
defendants moved to dismiss the pro se plaintiff's ADEA claim 
even though there was no legal basis for that motion,43 In denying 
the motion and imposing sanctions, the trial judge wrote, "I see no 
reason why the fact that plaintiff is proceeding pro se should 
redound to the benefit of defendants' attorney insofar as Rule 11 
sanctions are concerned." That no fees were incurred was immate­
rial. The court therefore awarded the pro se litigant the amount of 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 44 
Because trial judges are entrusted with much discretion in effec­
tuating the underlying policy of the FRCP,45 "the Civil Rules place 
virtually no limits on judicial creativity." 46 Thus the advisory com­
mittee encourages district courts engaging in the sanctioning 
calculus to consider many different factors relating to the off ending 
paper. 47 Specifically, the court may weigh certain equitable factors 
that do not necessarily re.fleet the expenses or fees incurred. 48 
Jackson v. Law Finn of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 
1989); Thomas v. capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane); cabell v. 
Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). 
40. Other sanctions available include oral or written reprimand, referral to disciplinary 
authorities, exclusion of evidence, dismissal or admission of certain elements of a pleading, 
and continuing-education classes. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note 'JI 12; 
WILLGING, supra note 1, at 127. 
41. See Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
42. Civ. A. No. 86-5209, 1987 WL 7842 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1987). 
43. See 1987 WL 7842, at *2. 
44. See 1987 WL 7842, at *3. For a discussion of what is "resonable," see infra Part IV. 
45. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 252 (2d Cir. 1985); cf. 
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note <I 12 (declining to restrict a district court's 
choice of sanctions). 
46. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Donaldson 
v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (affirming that trial judges have 
discretion to select the type of sanction to be imposed). 
For examples of truly creative sanctions, see Curran v. Price, 150 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Md. 
1993) (ordering attorney who blatantly disregarded requirements of the federal removal stat­
ute to copy out, by hand, the whole section on removal in Wright, Miller & Cooper's Federal 
Practice and Procedure); Huettig & Schramm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. 
Supp. 1519, 1522-23 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (ordering counsel's law firm to pay the adversary's 
attorney's fees and to circulate the judge's order to that effect among all partners and associ­
ates in the firm), affd., 190 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986). 
47. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note lj[ 12 (listing relevant factors). 
48. See JosEPH, supra note 1, § 16{B)(4), at 226 (citing cases); id. § 15B, at 214; see also 
Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the 
fashioning of sanctions is an equitable process). 
In fact, equity would permit federal courts to award these fees even absent Rule 11. See 
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) (holding that an award of attorney's fees is within courts' 
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Interpreting Rule 11 to include these considerations allows judges 
to assess an award substantial enough to force the offending party 
"to answer for [her] act. " 49 At bottom, the express grant of judicial 
latitude, coupled with the requirement that judges match sanctions 
to the requisite degree of deterrence, ensures that courts will 
impose sanctions, including attorney's fees, that reflect the offen­
siveness of the violation and not the representation vel non of the 
movant.50 
There is a final important reason to choose attorney's fees as the 
proper sanction. The use of sanctions other than attorney's fees is 
rare under Rule 11.51 Presumably judges would not consistently 
award these fees if the sanction did not serve the goals of the rule. 
To continue achieving those goals, judges should punish similar vio­
lations with similar sanctions, regardless of the movant's status.52 
Thus, when a movant is unrepresented, the judge should choose the 
same effective sanction that he would apply if the movant were not 
proceeding pro se - that is, a fees award. 
"equitable powers"); cf. Tllllothy B. Phelps, Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial 
Restraint, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 337, 348 (1987) (stating that the amended version of Rule 11 
"clarifies that the drafters intended the courts to invoke all equitable powers" in meeting the 
rule's goals). The thesis of this Note, however, is that judges need not rely on equity, nor on 
their inherent power to award fees, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991), nor 
on the fees-award provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing for attorney's fees when 
one party "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplies the proceedings), but instead need only 
avail themselves of Rule 11 to award attorney's fees to pro se litigants. 
49. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1987) (analo­
gizing a Rule 11 sanction to a sanction for contempt). An offending party usually cannot be 
made to "answer for [her] act" without paying a substantial sum, often equivalent to a rea­
sonable attorney's fee. See text accompanying notes 30-32 & 37. 
50. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
51. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 5 (analyzing 85 published Rule 11 decisions and find­
ing nonmonetary sanctions in only two cases); Raymond Bragar, Second Circuit, in SANC­
TIONS, supra note 1, at 41, 47 (finding attorney's fees the "sanction of choice" in the Second 
Circuit); Nelken, supra note 3, at 1333 (finding attorney's fees awarded in 96% of Rule 11 
cases studied); Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in 1 Civn. PRACTICE AND LmGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE CoUR'IS § 11-J-3, 
at 51 (Sol Schreiber et al. eds., 5th ed. 1992) (asserting that though Rule 11 provides for many 
types of sanctions, "courts most commonly award attorney's fees"). 
52. See supra text accompanying note SO; infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
The Second Circuit relied on a similar rationale in Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124 
(2d Cir. 1991), in which the court found the appellant's appeal frivolous and awarded the pro 
se appellees attorney's fees under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") 38. See 
932 F.2d at 125. That rule, similar to FRCP 11, provides: "If a court of appeals determines 
that an appeal is frivolous, it may . . .  award just damages and single or double costs to the 
appellee." FED. R. APP. P. 38. The advisory committee's note to FRAP 38 states that "dam­
ages" includes attorney's fees. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 advisory committee's note (1967 
amendment). In granting the fees, the Second Circuit found that the appellees "suffered 
considerable vexation" and that they were therefore entitled to the award notwithstanding 
the fact that they had incurred no attorney's fees. See Chemiakin, 932 F.2d at 130. Because 
FRCP ll(b) proscribes the very type of offensive (i.e., vexatious and frivolous) conduct 
found in Chemiakin, the Second Circuit's FRAP 38 analysis firmly supports an attorney's 
fees award to a pro se party under FRCP 11. 
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When the violation is wilful,s3 judges are similarly more likely to 
impose a fees award than any other sanction.s4 Therefore, when a 
party has taken advantage of a pro se litigant's status, for example, 
by inundating him with excessive motions or stimulating significant 
filing costs -significant in terms of the pro se party's financial 
resources -assessing an attorney's fee against the offending party 
has even more appeal. 
B. Arguments for Denying the Award 
Those who challenge the construction of Rule 11 's attorney's 
fees provision advanced in this Note launch two types of ob jec­
tions.ss Section B.1 discusses the first type, which is based on a 
literal interpretation of the rule's text. The phrase attorney's fees, 
the argument goes, plainly precludes an award when there is no 
attorney. Section B.1 demonstrates why, in light of the ramifica­
tions of this strict-constructionist approach, that attack falls short.S6 
The second category of ob jections encompasses more general policy 
concerns about awarding fees. Section B.2 evaluates these ob jec­
tions, including those based on fears of granting movants a windfall 
and of significantly increasing the number of Rule 11 motions filed 
in the district courts, and concludes that they too are unpersuasive. 
1. Statutory Construction 
Rule 11 speaks of "attorney's fees . . . incurred. "S7 The literal 
meaning of these words presents a potential bar to any fees recov­
ery by a pro se movant. Indeed, the Supreme Court has asserted 
that it will "give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain 
meaning ... and generally \vith them as with a statute, '[w]hen we 
find the terms . . . unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.' "SS 
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(l) (proscribing any filing made for an "improper purpose"), 
54. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 31. 
55. Of course, to speak of these opponents as if they were a unified force is somewhat 
misleading, as the issue discussed in this Note has not received much attention in the legal 
community. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. These "opponents" instead represent 
an amalgam of the few judges who have issued opinions on the subject, see supra notes 42-44 
and infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text, those judges and commentators who have 
made similar objections in related contexts, see infra Part III, and jurists who generally 
invoke the principles of strict statutory construction, see infra section 11.B.1. 
56. This Note thus encourages judges to interpret the existing language of the rule to 
achieve the proposed result The same result could be reached outright by amending the 
language of Rule 11, although following that course is not necessary. See infra notes 66-72 
and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of the Federal Rules beyond their strict 
statutory language). 
57. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2). 
58. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (citing 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980), and quoting Rubin v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)); see also Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 
Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 541 (1991). 
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The Court has noted that even if it were to agree that a novel inter­
pretation would effectuate the legislative policy underlying Rule 11, 
"[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it."59 
The district court adopted this view in Committe v. Dennis 
Reimer Co., 60 one of the few reported decisions that ask whether 
pro se movants may obtain fees under Rule 11. In that case, the 
court denied fees for the pro se plaintiff based on the rule's lan­
guage. While the court agreed with the movant that an attorney's 
fees award would further Rule 11 's deterrence goal and would be 
consistent with the advisory committee's note,61 it felt bound by the 
plain meaning of the word "incurred" and therefore refused to 
grant the fees motion.62 
A second language-based argument asserts that because the 
word attorney implies that an agency relationship exists between 
two individuals,63 "the terms 'pro se' and 'attorney' are mutually 
exclusive. "64 The notion of an attorney's fee assumes that there is 
one person - an attorney - charging another.65 Consequently, 
this argument suggests, any of the policy justifications above -
including those founded on the multiple goals of deterrence, com­
pensation, and punishment, and those seeking to maintain consis-
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917), provides an early articulation of this 
"plain meaning rule": "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain • . .  the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." See also 242 U.S. at 485 (stating 
that when "the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of inter­
pretation does not arise"). 
One influential commentator, however, has suggested that lower courts do not uniformly 
heed the Supreme Court's advice: "[C]ontrary to the traditional operation of the plain mean­
ing rule, courts are increasingly willing to consider other indicia of intent and meaning from 
the start rather than beginning their inquiry by considering only the language of the act." 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 46.07, at 126 (5th ed. 
1992). 
59. Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126. Though one could argue that this statement is 
mere dictum and thus does not bind lower courts in fashioning an effective Rule 11 sanction, 
there are stronger reasons for not adopting a strict plain-meaning approach. See infra notes 
66-72 and accompanying text 
60. 150 F.R.D. 495 (D. Vt. 1993). 
61. The court further noted that the goals of Rule 11 differ significantly from those of 
§ 1988 and that therefore the cases denying fees under that statute should not resolve the 
Rule 11 inquiry. See Committe, 150 F.R.D. at 501-02; see also infra section 111.A.3 (discussing 
and distinguishing the goals of § 1988). 
62. See Committe, 150 F.R.D. at 502 (requiring "payment" of fees before the award can 
be granted). The district court in Salamon v. Messina, No. 87-C-2097 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6118 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1991), affd., Nos. 91-2248, 91-2400, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5884 (7th 
Cir. Mar. 25, 1997), similarly denied a Rule 11 fees motion made by a pro se party because 
the movant represented himself. See Salamon, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6118, at *3. 
63. See Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508, 1519-21 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Roney, 
J., dissenting) (providing 24 dictionary definitions to support the claim). 
64. Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1518 (Roney, J., dissenting) (discussing attorney's-fees provision 
in§ 1988). 
65. See Jones v. Lujan, 883.F.2d 1031, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
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tent practice under Rule 11 -would appear to fail in the face of 
clear statutory language. 
The literalist approach, however, falters once one appreciates 
the flexibility actually afforded by the Supreme Court's interpretive 
methodology·for Rule 11 cases. Although the Court refused to con­
strue the rule beyond its literal meaning in Pavelic & LeFlore v. 
Marvel Entertainment Group, 66 the language of that opinion does 
a l ow for latitude in interpreting and enforcing Rule 11 in some sit­
uations. The Court implied that it might give weight to congres­
sional policy if doing so would not require an "unnatural " 
construction of the text.67 Applying Rule 11 so as to deter future 
violative conduct -as this Note proposes -furthers the congres­
sional ob jectives that Pavelic & LeFlore sought to protect68 and 
thus seems quite consistent with a "natural " reading of the rule. 
A pro se litigant's request for an attorney's fees award consti­
tutes one of those "rare cases " in which, because "the literal appli­
cation of a [rule would] produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters . . . those intentions must be control­
ling. "69 Unlike a case such as Pavelic & LeFlore, in which the Court 
had to decide whether to extend the liability of one attorney to the 
whole law firm,7o the case of the pro se litigant asks whether a court 
will impose any significant liability at a l . A court that declined to 
impose this liability certainly would be producing "a result demon­
strably at odds " with the goal of Rule 11 -prevention of baseless 
and harassing litigation conduct.71 Because the Court has stated 
66. 493 U.S. 120 (1989); see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
67. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126 ("(W]e would not feel free to pursue that 
[legislative] objective at the expense of a textual interpretation as unnatural as [has been 
proposed]."). 
68. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126; cf. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) 
(finding that the "plain-meaning rule is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and 
does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists" (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928))). 
Moreover, canons of statutory interpretation provide that the Federal Rules are to be con­
strued liberally. See 3A SINGER, supra note 58, § 67.10, at 87; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating 
that the Rules are to "be construed • • •  to secure the just • . •  determination of every action"). 
For decisions that advocate forgoing strict construction in favor of legislative policy, see Sam­
uels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1991); Rod Warren Ink v. 
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 325, 326 (9th Cir. 1990); Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. 
P.I.E., Inc., 853 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1988); Lawrence v. Staats, 640 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). But see In re Erickson Partnership (United States v. Erickson Partnership), 856 F.2d 
1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a conflict between legislative history and statutory 
language is insufficient to justify departure from clear provisions). 
69. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); accord Bob Jones Univ. 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); see also Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of 
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the inten­
tion of its makers."). 
70. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 121. 
71. See supra Part I. 
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that it will consider legislative intent when that intent clearly con­
tradicts statutory language72 - and because fulfilling the deter­
rence objective of Rule 11 necessitates reading the "attorneys' fees 
. . . incurred" language more liberally than its strict construction 
would permit - the plain-meaning argument ultimately must fail. 
2. Policy Concerns in Making the Award 
In addition to positing objections based on statutory language, 
those who oppose fees awards for pro se parties proffer broader 
policy arguments to support their interpretation. They argue, for 
instance, that granting fees in any amount greater than actual 
expenses incurred would prove a windfall for the movant. This 
argument loses force in light of two countervailing factors. First, 
Rule 11 is not primarily a compensatory provision; it is about deter­
ring future litigation abuse.73 Therefore, in fixing the amount of a 
fees award, a district court need not rely as heavily on what the pro 
se party lost as much as on the quality of the violative action. 
Second,. if the choice is between granting a litigant more than he 
may actually "deserve" and not punishing or not deterring behavior 
that violates the norms of civil procedure, adherence to the goals of 
Rule 11 counsels in favor of the former option.74 For example, in 
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 1s the Rule 11 movant "lost" nothing because his 
insurance carrier paid for his defense; strictly speaking, he incurred 
no fees. The court, however, found that the offending party was not 
entitled to a "free" violation of Rule 11 on account of the defend­
ant's prudence in procuring insurance. The court therefore allowed 
the movant to recover fees.76 Granting a pro se litigant reasonable 
attorney's fees constitutes an excessive award only if one errone­
ously measures what is "reasonable" by actual costs and fees 
72. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) (per curiam) 
(interpreting the Truth in Lending Act); supra note 69 and accompanying text. The Fifth 
Circuit similarly has stated: "[S]tatutory construction must not occur in a vacuum. Statutes 
are contextual as well as textual . . • .  Courts must also look to the . • .  broad national policy 
which prompted the legislation." Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)). 
73. See supra Part I. Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved a sanction that inciden­
tally conferred a benefit on the moving party when the sanction was necessary to carry out 
Rule ll's objective. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 
498 U.S. 533, 551-53 (1991) (affirming fees award over objection based on the Rules Enabling 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), which prohibits courts from enacting any rules that "abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right" embodied in the FRCP). 
74. See supra Part I. 
75. 987 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
76. See 987 F.2d at 719. 
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incurred and not by the other systemic costs77 that the underlying 
policy of the rule seeks to reduce. 
Other worries about awarding pro se litigants attorney's fees are 
similarly unconvincing. The rule itself allays any concern that the 
possibility of high awards will result in a proliferation of unwar­
ranted Rule 11 motions, which in tum would detract attention from 
the underlying causes of action. Any abuse of the judicial system, 
even in a fees petition, can result in Rule 11 sanctions being 
imposed on the original movant.78 The rule's deterrent aspect thus 
should forestall any proliferation of distracting motions.79 Con­
cerns about enlarging judges' workloads80 - even on account of 
nonfrivolous fees petitions - similarly carry little weight: if courts 
consistently impose sanctions, those sanctions will deter frivolous 
actions and motions, and burdens on judicial dockets will decrease. 
Far from controverting the goal of the attorney's-fees provision -
which is the worry in the statutory fee-shifting casess1 - imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorney's fees, even in favor of 
pro se litigants, furthers the underlying objective of the rule.82 
Ill. FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS VERSUS RULE 11 
Although courts deny pro se litigants attorney's fees almost 
without exception under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the 
Freedom of Information Act, and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act,83 this Part argues that those courts' holdings should 
77. These costs include the waste of judicial resources in hearing frivolous motions, delay 
or even loss of the pro se litigant's legitimate claims, and decreased professionalism in the 
bar. 
78. "(T]he filing of a motion for sanctions is itself subject to the requirements of the rule 
and can lead to sanctions." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 22; see, e.g., 
United States v. City of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
79. Contrary to most predictions following the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, no cottage 
industry in Rule 11 motions has arisen in the federal courts. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 
109-10. There seems to be little danger of this litigation explosion because courts still can and 
do readily deny frivolous motions. See Vmcent M. Waldman, Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?: 
Attorney Fees for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L. REv. 659, 673 (1982). 
80. See Waldman, supra note 79, at 668 (finding that pro se actions often crowd the 
courts, consume much of the courts' time, and are poorly managed). 
81. See infra Part III. 
82. One final argument against awarding attorney's fees to a pro se litigant, which has 
appeared in the FOIA context, is that any fees award would be excessive because it would 
impose a penalty on the opposing party. See Waldman, supra note 79, at 668 (citing Barrett 
v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). In the Rule 11 context, 
this concern is not a concern at all; the rule is geared partially toward punishing offending 
parties. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. The great majority of cases discussing 
attorney's fees for pro se parties centers on these three statutes. One court has gone so far as 
to assert that there is "no fundamental difference" among the policies underlying the fees 
provisions in the FOIA, the EAJA, and § 1988. See Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 
1985) (per curiam). 
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not control the Rule 11 analysis. In rejecting fees petitions under 
those statutes, courts invoke two separate rationales. The first 
focuses on the legislative policies underlying the various statutes. 
Section III.A outlines those policies and demonstrates why they do 
not apply to Rule 11 motions. The second rationale focuses specifi­
cally on those pro se litigants who are attorneys; in that situation 
courts reason that, because there is no lawyer-client relationship, 
even a pro se attorney should not receive an attorney's fees award. 
Section III.B concludes that although the absence of such a rela­
tionship is often dispositive in the fee-shifting cases, it should not 
affect the decision to grant attorney's fees to pro se litigants - lay 
or legally trained - under Rule 11. 
A. Policy Goals 
Rule 11 provides sanctions for litigation abuse; it is not a fee­
shifting statute.84 Thus this section provides examples of cases 
involving three major fee-shifting provisions and distinguishes the 
policy concerns in those cases from the goals that drive Rule 11. 
Insofar as these cases discuss policies that are not implicated in the 
Rule 11 context, they are inapposite; insofar as the cases discuss 
broader procedural goals that are not particular to the statutes in 
question, their reasoning supports an award of attorney's fees to a 
pro se litigant under Rule 11. 
The overriding objective of the fee-shifting provisions is to 
encourage litigants to seek representation in meritoriou� cases.ss 
For cases denying fees under the three statutes, see infra notes 89, 92, 95. Though a few 
appellate courts have affirmed an award of fees under these statutes in the past, see, e.g., 
Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (§ 1988); Cazalas v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983) (FOIA); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 
1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FOIA), their holdings have now been either expressly - in the case of 
§ 1988 - or implicitly - in the cases of the FOIA and the EAJA - overruled by the 
Supreme Court's § 1988 decision in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). See infra section 
III.A.3 (discussing Kay). After Kay, the D.C. Circuit recognized that it could no longer 
countenance the award of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under § 1988 or the FOIA. See 
Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying fees under the 
FOIA). The D.C. Circuit's rationale extends easily to EAJA motions as well. 
84. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 
553 (1991} (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 409 (1990)); Doering 
v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Rule's 
primary purpose is not 'wholesale fee-shifting but [rather] correction of litigation abuse.' " 
(quoting Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) (alteration in original)}); 
see also Melissa Nelken et al., U.S. Supreme Court, in SANCTIONS, supra note 1, at 9, 12; supra 
notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Thus any attempt to analyze or interpret the rule as a 
fee-shifting mechanism - or to analogize to other fee-shifting provisions - is misplaced. 
See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 175-76 (citing Schwarzer, supra note 1). 
85. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text; Karen Shulman, Comment, To Fee, or 
Not to Fee: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Attorney In Collecting Attorney's Fees, 16 W. ST. U. L. 
REv. 303, 311 (1988). Shulman observes that these provisions are designed to "remove eco­
nomic obstacles to legitimate claims." Id. Obviously, courts enforcing those statutes should 
seek to honor that objective. To the extent that Rule 11 courts also choose to place that dual 
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Whereas those provisions concentrate on vindicating the rights of 
the moving party, Rule 11 focuses on deterring the conduct of the 
offending party. As such, the particular characteristics of the Rule 
11 movant are less important than the quality and degree of the 
offense. 
1. The Equal Access to Justice Act 
The primary goal of the BAJA is to increase accessibility to the 
courts for plaintiffs whose means would otherwise preclude them 
from challenging governmental action. 86 By granting fees to parties 
litigating against the government, the statute encourages individuals 
to vindicate their rights, through an attorney, when the govern­
ment's position is unreasonable.87 Because success on the merits is 
less probable when a party is unrepresented - a skilled attorney is 
more likely than a layperson to identify the government's weak 
arguments88 - representation by counsel in an BAJA action is 
essential to the effectuation of congressional policy. For this rea­
son, courts have been reluctant to grant fees to pro se litigants 
under the BAJA; doing so, they fear, would implicitly endorse the 
practice of proceeding pro se and would thereby contradict the 
BAJA's objectives.89 By contrast, legal representation has little 
bearing on the principles underlying Rule 11. That rule focuses on 
the conduct of the opposing party, not on the arguments of the 
movant. The concern is not whether the pro se litigant can put 
forth his strongest arguments on the underlying cause of action, but 
whether his opponent will abide by the strictures of Rule 11.90 
Allowing a party to proceed without an attorney thus does not frus­
trate the aims of Rule 11 's attorney's-fees provision. 
One might contend that representation of the pro se litigant 
could bear on the effectuation of Rule 11 policy in the following 
emphasis on economic costs and meritorious arguments, they will grant the attorney's fees 
and thereby create an economic disincentive to file frivolous, i.e. meritless, papers. 
86. See SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d 805, 809 {2d Cir. 1994) (Leval, J., dissenting in 
part) (emphasizing compensation of the plaintiff); Celeste v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1069, 1070 
{11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (emphasizing meritorious claims); Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d 16, 
17 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (emphasizing vindication of private parties' rights); see also 
Deborah Weinstein, Recent Decision, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 865, 867, 868 n.22 (1990) (discussing 
Jones v. Lujan, 883 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
87. See Louise L Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 19 
Aruz. ST. LJ. 229, 234 & n.28, 243 (1987). 
88. Cf. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) 
(discussing the benefits of representation under the Privacy Act, which contains fee.shifting 
language nearly identical to that of the EAJA). 
89. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d at 808; Hexamer v. Foreness, 997 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam); Celeste, 988 F.2d at 1070; Demarest v. Manspeaker, 948 F.2d 655 (10th 
Cir. 1991); Naekel v. Department of Transp., 845 F.2d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Merrell v. 
Block, 809 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1987); Crooker, 763 F.2d at 16. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
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way: The pro se litigant's adversary might believe that only an 
attorney, and not an unrepresented party, would be vigilant enough 
to recognize and prosecute a Rule 11 violation. If so, the offending 
party might think twice before running afoul of the rule if the 
potential movant were to have an attorney. A court might there­
fore choose to deny the fees and not to "reward" a party who repre­
sented himself - with the intention of encouraging parties to retain 
an attorney, thereby discouraging litigation abuse. The argument 
falls short, however, on closer examination. In the statutory con­
text refusing to grant pro se litigants attorney's fees gives parties an 
incentive to hire an attorney at the commencement of the action. 
The Rule 11 movant, on the other hand, does not decide at the 
outset of his case whether or not to hire a lawyer simply based on 
the possibility of suffering a Rule 11 violation down the road. 
Denying the fees under Rule 11, as opposed to under the BAJA, 
will not encourage litigants to seek representation in future cases, 
and thus does not further the goals of Rule 11. 
2. The Freedom of Information Act 
The goal of the FOIA's fees-award provision is to compensate 
plaintiffs for any costs and fees legitimately incurred in holding the 
government to the disclosure requirements of the Act.91 The Sixth 
Circuit, in Falcone v. IRS, observed that because the plaintiff in that 
case never experienced the financial burden that Congress designed 
the FOIA's fee-shifting provision to relieve, he was not entitled to 
the fees award.92 Falcone thus suggests that an award of attorney's 
fees hinges on the evil at which the fees provision is directed. 
Under this policy prescription - as opposed to the statutory goals 
particular to the FOIA93 - a court should award fees only when 
the movant experiences the rule's enunciated harm. Accordingly, 
when a pro se party suffers a Rule 11 violation, courts should not 
hesitate to award him attorney's fees:94 after a Rule 11 violation, 
91. See Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983). Other courts have interpreted the 
FOIA's goals similarly, with some slight variations. See, e.g., Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 
993 F.2d 257, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that the goal is "virtually identical" to that found 
in § 1988 - to facilitate access to the courts); Cazalas v. United States Dept of Justice, 709 
F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that the goal is to remove monetary barriers to ensur­
ing governmental compliance with the FOIA); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 
1981) (asserting that the goal is to "remove obstacles to legitimate claims"). 
92. See Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647 (noting that plaintiff never incurred the "burden of legal 
[fees]" that the rule was intended to alleviate). For other decisions denying attorney's fees to 
pro se litigants under the FOIA, see Benavides, 993 F.2d at 260; Cunningham, 664 F.2d at 
388; Crooker v. United States Dept of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980). 
93. See cases cited supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
94. In Benavides, 993 F.2d 257, the appellate court chose not to accept the petitioner's 
argument that the FOIA's underlying goal was one of deterrence, and it denied the fees 
motion. The court's decision may lend indirect support to an award under Rule 11, however: 
the Benavides opinion characterizes deterrence as a mere "serendipitous by-product" of 
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the pro se movant (and the judicial system overall) has experienced 
exactly the type of harm that Congress hoped to curtail - namely, 
defending against frivolous or abusive pleadings. 
3. Section 1988 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kay v. Ehrler,9s a §  1988 case, 
effectively closed the book on awarding fees to pro se litigants 
under most statutory fee-shifting provisions. Ironically, however, 
the reasoning behind the Court's denial of fees supports an award 
of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under Rule 11. The Kay Court 
relied on Congress's intention of helping civil rights plaintiffs retain 
competent counsel.96 Congress, the Court asserted, was concerned 
with the "effective prosecution of meritorious claims,"97 a goal that 
could be best met only if a party were represented by an attorney. 
Because Kay proceeded pro se, the Court denied him his fees 
request. To the extent the Kay holding depends on specific legisla­
tive policy, it is inapposite, as the goals of Rule 11 are significantly 
different from those of § 1988.98 To the extent the Kay opinion 
exemplifies the Court's desire to encourage meritorious claims and 
to satisfy legislative intent, it actually supports a fees award under 
Rule 11: the deterrent effect of such a sanction will be to encourage 
attorneys to examine the merits of their pleadings more closely 
before filing them.99 
B. The Absence of an Agency Relationship 
Although the Kay Court concluded that the goals of § 1983 
would be ill served if the Court were to award fees to a plaintiff­
attorney who represented himself,100 this section demonstrates that 
the goals of Rule 11 can be met equally well no matter whether the 
sanctions under the FOIA. See 993 F.2d at 260. This language could suggest that when 
deterrence is the central goal of a statute, a court might be more amenable to awarding a pro 
se party attorney's fees. 
95. 499 U.S. 432 (1991). 
96. See 499 U.S. at 435-36. 
97. 499 U.S. at 437. The appellate court in this case similarly noted that "attorney's fees 
. . .  under section 1988 are not awarded as penalties or sanctions." Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 
967, 972 (6th Cir. 1990). A Rule 11 award by definition is intended as a sanction. See supra 
note 2 (quoting Rule 11). 
98. See supra Part I. 
99. To be sure, there is a difference between encouraging meritorious actions - the goal 
of § 1988 - and discouraging meritless ones - the goal of Rule 11. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 437. 
If the goal of § 1988, however, is to allow aggrieved parties to vindicate their rights, it seems 
appropriate to extend the Kay rationale to the Rule 11 context, in which movants defend 
their right - and the right of the court - to be free from abusive litigation tactics. 
100. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 438. The Court declared that even though the movant was a 
competent attorney, he lacked the objective judgment necessary to argue his case most effec­
tively. See 499 U.S. at 437. 
, 
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movant is represented or not, and no matter whether he is an attor­
ney or not.101 
In refusing to award fees, both Kay and Falcone emphasized the 
absence of an attorney-client relationship.102 The Falcone court 
assumed that even though the pro se litigant was an attorney by 
trade, he did not have the "'detached and objective perspective' 
necessary to fulfill the aims of the Act."103 The objectivity of a 
Rule 11 movant, by contrast, does not implicate the goals of that 
rule because whether the movant is or is not an attorney has no 
relation to the opposition's conduct. Each party bears the burden 
of conducting itself according to the rules, regardless of whether its 
adversary has legal representation. Indeed, there should be no 
need to require a pro se party to hire an attorney just to keep a 
represented party honest. There is thus no reason to require an 
attorney-client relationship before punishing a party who violates 
the rule and awarding attorney's fees to the pro se movant. 
At best, a litigant will engage in behavior that violates Rule 11 
regardless of her pro se adversary's status; at worst, she will try to 
take advantage of that status and the attendant lack of legal acu­
men, or lack of objectivity, or both. In that latter case there is all 
the more reason to impose a significant sanction in order to deter 
such abuse. The district court underscored this view in Rynkiewicz 
v. Jeanes Hospital: "If anything, this duty [to abide by the require­
ments of Rule 11] was heightened by the fact that plaintiff was pro­
ceeding pro se, and thus without the advantage of having an 
attorney" who could better recognize the shortcomings of the oppo­
sition's arguments and the nature of its tactics.104 
IV. CALCULATING THE AWARD 
Once a court decides that it should award the pro se litigant 
reasonable attorney's fees, it must determine the actual sum. The 
calculation of any fees award in favor of a pro se party is admittedly 
an inexact process.105 This Part proposes that courts invoke tradi­
tional methods of determining a reasonable fee while also relying 
101. The argument in this section is slightly different from that addressed supra section 
11.B.1. That section answers objections based solely on the text of Rule 11 and concludes that 
that language does not foreclose a fees award. The analysis in this section poses the broader 
question of whether, as a policy matter, we nonetheless should demand that an attorney be 
retained before awarding Rule 11 attorney's fees; this section concludes that we should not. 
102. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36; Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1983). 
103. Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647 (quoting White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 
388 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)); see also supra note 100. 
104. See Rynkiewicz v. Jeanes Hosp., Civ. A. No. 86-5209, 1987 WL 7842, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 11, 1987). 
105. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(observing that the award is discretionary and lacks "mathematical precision"); Pilkington v. 
Bevilacqua, 522 F. Supp. 906, 910 (D.R.I. 1981) (contending that, under § 1988, there can be 
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on their discretion to fashion an award that best serves the policies 
of Rule 11.106 
Rule 11 contemplates an award commensurate with the amount 
necessary to deter the offensive conduct. Thus although courts may 
consider the costs incurred by the movant,101 the reasonable-fees 
award will not necessarily match the actual amount paid.1os Courts 
should look beyond what fees a litigant did or did not incur and 
instead should ascertain the amount necessary to deter offensive 
litigation conduct.109 
In determining this amount, courts should consider what an 
attorney would have charged for the requisite work performed by 
the pro se litigant. This lodestar approachllO has appeal both in its 
simplicity and in its acceptance in other areas of the law.111 It may 
have little relation to the value of the pro se litigant's work in a 
particular case, however, as he can neither command as high a rate 
nor complete the work in as little time as could a practicing attor­
ney. Nonetheless, the method does provide a judge with a rough 
indication of how large a sanction may be necessary to prevent 
future offensive conduct - indeed, the text of Rule 11 suggests that 
an award equal to reasonable attorney's fees often will serve the 
appropriate deterrent effect.112 
Courts could choose instead to base the award on the movant's 
lost opportunity costs.113 This approach would serve the rule's sec-
no mathematical formula for calculating the award because the pro se litigant incurs no legal 
fees). 
106. Recall Justice Marshall's admonition that "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes of 
Rule 11 is to strengthen the hand of the trial judge in his efforts to police abusive litigation 
practices and to provide him sufficient flexibility to craft penalties appropriate to each case." 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). The advisory committee similarly advocates a discretionary approach. See Feo. 
R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note paras. 17-18 (committing the determination of a 
sanction to the trial court's discretion and providing for case-by-case evaluation); see also 
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 720. 
107. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2) (allowing for "reasonable attorneys' fees and other 
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation"). 
108. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
109. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126 (stating that the purpose of Rule 11 is to 
sanction the offending party, not to reimburse the offended party). 
110. The "lodestar" is commonly defined as the "number of hours reasonably expended 
multiplied by [the] prevailing hourly rate in [the] community for similar work." BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 941 (6th ed. 1990). 
111. The Supreme Court, for example, adopted the lodestar approach for § 1988 cases in 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
112. See FEo. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2). 
113. See Waldman, supra note 79, at 680-81 for a discussion of opportunity costs. One 
district court has intimated that lost income should be a factor in awarding fees to a pro se 
litigant under the EAJA. See SEC v. Kaufman, 835 F. Supp. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd. 
sub nom SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1994). 
Although the Sixth Circuit based its denial of fees in Kay partly on the fact that opportu­
nity costs are not the same as pecuniary losses and thus should not enter the § 1988 analysis, 
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ondary goal of compensation, though it might achieve minimal 
deterrence if the opportunity costs were relatively low. Calculating 
these costs, moreover, presents problems of subjective valuation 
and high administrative costs.114 Furthermore, because courts do 
not award opportunity costs to represented parties as part of their 
attorney's fees award, maintaining consistent treatment of all mov­
ants requires that courts deny such costs to pro se litigants as 
wen.115 A pro se litigant might receive absolutely nothing, however 
- and an offending party would get off scot-free - if courts were 
to deny the movant both opportunity costs and attorney's fees. As 
noted above, resorting to opportunity costs seems ill advised given 
Rule ll's emphasis on deterrence. We thus return to reasonable 
attorney's fees as the most sensible measure of the award. 
Perhaps the strongest set of criteria for determining a "reason­
able" attorney's fee is found in Johnson v. Georgia Highway 
Express, Inc.116 The twelve Johnson factors,117 which generally con­
sider the time and skill required for the work, compose the standard 
calculus for a Rule 11 sanction in many courts.118 Many of those 
criteria, however, do not arise in the pro se context, so a court 
would be better off concentrating not on the distinct factors them­
selves but on the policy that underlies them. That policy - implicit 
in the twelve enumerated factors - entails a combination of what 
amount would be reasonable given, in descending order of impor­
tance, the offense and the response required, the necessary degree 
see Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990), the Supreme Court did not address this 
issue. 
114. Courts could reduce those problems by equating the value of leisure time with the 
value of time spent at work - that is, by using the litigant's hourly wage to calculate oppor­
tunity costs. When a litigant has either no job or a low-paying job, however, this calculation 
would produce a figure too low to serve any deterrent effect. Thus, compensating the pro se 
party for his time and effort seems a necessary but insufficient approach to the problem. 
115. See Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1981); supra text accompanying 
notes 33-34, 52. 
116. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
117. The twelve factors are time and labor required; novelty and difficulty of the work 
performed; requisite skill; preclusion of other employment; customary fee in the community; 
whether the fee was fixed or contingent; time limitations imposed by the court or by other 
circumstances; amount of money involved and results obtained; experience, ability, and repu­
tation of the attorney; "undesirability" of the case; nature and length of the attorney-client 
relationship; and awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 488 F2d at 717-19. 
118. See, e.g., Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994); 
Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F2d 1536, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992); Homeward Bound, Inc. v. 
Hissom Meml. Ctr., 963 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1992); Leffler v. Meer, 936 F2d 981, 985 & 
n.2 (7th Cir. 1991); United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 
415 (2d Cir. 1989). 
Some commentators have suggested that the Johnson criteria differ little from that of the 
simpler lodestar approach. See Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 
F.R.D. 237, 244 (1985). The Task Force noted that the first and most heavily weighted John­
son factor is time and labor expended. See id. 
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of compensation, and the desire to provide a check against arbitrary 
awards. 
Reading the Johnson criteria in this way reinforces the notion 
that judges calculating an attorney's fees award for a pro se litigant 
enjoy wide latitude limited only by considerations of deterrence 
and fairness - considerations that underlie Rule 11 itself. Because 
a Rule 11 sanction will almost always be case specific, 119 tempering 
rigid formulae such as the lodestar or the Johnson approach with 
judicial discretion ensures that judges will impose attorney's fees 
awards that adequately deter improper and frivolous filings. 
CONCLUSION 
"Allowing a citizen who hired an attorney to get fees but not 
[making the award to pro se litigants] creates a windfall for the 
defendant who doesn't have to pay the fees . . .  just because he had 
the good fortune to commit his wrong" upon an unrepresented 
party.120 Beyond creating a windfall, denying the pro se party an 
attorney's-fees award controverts express legislative policy. Any 
objections to making the award that are based on a strict interpreta­
tion of the rule's language or on fee-shifting provisions in other 
statutes must fail in the face of Congress's, the bar's, and society's 
insistence on deterring offensive and abusive litigation practices. 
Granting the pro se litigant attorney's fees does no more than 
ensure that parties play by the rules and that they suffer the appro­
priate consequences when they transgress those rules. 
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 12; supra note 106. 
120. Shulman, supra note 85, at 310. Though this statement refers to pro se attorneys 
who sue under statutory fee-shifting provisions, it is equally applicable to Rule 11 cases. 
